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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE CONTINUING CARE EXCEPTION: IS THIS BUBBLE ABOUT
TO BURST?
MONTGOMERY v. SOUTH COUNTY RADIOLOGISTS, INC.

I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last couple of decades, the number of medical malpractice claims
has been on the rise.1 In response to the perceived medical malpractice crisis
this has created, a number of state legislatures have promulgated statutory
provisions intended to deal with the problems posed by frivolous malpractice
actions and exorbitant damage awards.2 Often these provisions shorten the
statute of limitations for filing a medical malpractice action.3
In contrast to these states, Missouri’s existing medical malpractice statute
was already suited to accomplish this objective. Rather, in Missouri, the same
statute has been in force for at least seventy years, and has changed very little
in recent years as a result of this quandary. Section 516.105 of the Missouri
Revised Statutes provides that:
All actions against physicians, hospitals, dentists, registered or licensed
practical nurses, optometrists, podiatrists, pharmacists, chiropractors,
professional physical therapists, and any other entity providing health care
services and all employees of any of the foregoing acting in the course and
scope of their employment, for damages for malpractice, negligence, error or
mistake related to health care shall be brought within two years from the date
of occurrence of the act of neglect complained of. . . .4

Section 516.105 effectively reduces the number of medical malpractice suits
because the statute of limitations commences from the date the negligent act
occurs and not from the date of discovery. Moreover, this statute has been
construed very strictly in favor of physicians in order to bar malpractice
actions.5 While many jurisdictions have instituted a discovery rule, in which

1. George L. Blum, Annotation, Medical Malpractice: Who Are “Health Care Providers,”
or the Like, Whose Actions Fall Within Statutes Specifically Governing Actions and Damages for
Medical Malpractice, 12 A.L.R.5d 1 (1993); James Bartimus et al., Protecting Plaintiff’s Rights
in the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 53 U. MO. K.C. L. REV. 27, 28 (1984).
2. Blum, supra note 1, at 1.
3. Id.
4. MO. REV. STAT. § 516.105 (2000).
5. Howard Schwartz, The Law of Medical Malpractice in Missouri, 28 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
397, 430 (1984).
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the statute of limitations is not tolled until actual discovery of the negligent act,
Missouri courts and the Missouri Legislature have rejected such a proposal and
instead have continued to carve out narrow exceptions to section 516.105.
The “continuing care rule” is one such exception. The continuing care rule
refuses to treat a negligent act as a discrete occurrence when a patient is in an
on-going relationship with a physician. Rather, the wrong is treated as if
recommitted each time the doctor treats the patient and fails to find the
previously ignored medical condition.6 The underlying theory behind this rule
is that the physician is guilty of malpractice during the entire physician-patient
relationship because he did not properly diagnose the illness.7 While the
continuing care rule has been applied in multiple cases to toll the statute of
limitations against an individual physician, before Montgomery v. South
County Radiologists, Inc.,8 Missouri courts had never extended the application
of this exception to a health care entity.9
In Montgomery, the Missouri Supreme Court continued to “chip away” at
section 516.105 by expanding the “continuing care exception” and applying it
not only to physicians, but to diagnostic health care entities as well.10 Missouri
courts handled similar situations in the past, but chose to not extend the
continuing care rule.11 Montgomery, however, provided the ideal opportunity
to extend this exception. In Montgomery, two years and eight months after the
radiology services prescribed by his neurosurgeon began, plaintiff Evan
Montgomery and his wife filed suit against South County Radiologists
(“SCR”), which failed to recognize a cancerous spinal tumor after reviewing
three films on three occasions, eight months apart.12 Montgomery also filed
suit against Dr. Szoko, an individual radiologist working for the group who
negligently reviewed Montgomery’s first film more than two years earlier.
The circuit court awarded summary judgment to Dr. Szoko and awarded partial
summary judgment to SCR.13 The Montgomerys appealed and the Eastern
District reversed and remanded both grants of summary judgment, holding that
Montgomery presented sufficient evidence of continuing care by both Dr.

6. Gerald D. McBeth, Medical Malpractice: When Does the Statute of Limitations Begin to
Run?, 35 MO. L. REV. 559, 562 (1970).
7. Id.
8. Montgomery v. S. County Radiologists, Inc., 49 S.W.3d 191 (Mo. 2001).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See Shah v. Lehman, 953 S.W.2d 955 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); Dunagan v. Shalom
Geriatric Ctr., 967 S.W.2d 285 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998). Both courts declined to extend the
“continuing care” exception to health care entities. However, the facts of both cases made it was
unnecessary to reach this issue. For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes 89-107 and
accompanying text.
12. Montgomery, 49 S.W.3d at 192.
13. Id.
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Szoko and SCR to satisfy the continuing care rule.14 Upon transfer, the
Missouri Supreme Court held that the continuing care rule applied to toll the
statute of limitations against the radiology group.15
Before Montgomery, many Missouri courts stretched the continuing care
exception to toll the malpractice statute in circumstances dealing with the
physician-patient relationship framework. Montgomery adds a new dimension
to the equation: the relationship between the patient and diagnostic entity.
After Montgomery, one issue to be discussed is whether the court has gone too
far in applying this exception to a health care entity or whether this a necessary
change.
In Parts II through V, this Note will discuss the history of the continuing
care exception, the policies behind it, its limitations and the extent to which the
Montgomery holding expands the exception almost to the breaking point. Part
VI will explore the implications of the Montgomery holding on patients,
physicians and health care entities. Finally, the author will discuss why the
Montgomery court’s sizeable stretch of the continuing care rule to toll the
statute of limitations is inappropriate given the longstanding rationale behind
the exception in Missouri. As part of this discussion, an alternative rule is
considered.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS OF MISSOURI’S CONTINUING CARE
EXCEPTION
The Missouri continuing care exception began in Thatcher v. DeTar.16 In
Thatcher, the doctor performed surgery on the patient for appendicitis and
negligently left a surgical needle in her body.17 Following the operation, the
patient experienced pain and continued treatment with her doctor.18 After two
years of continuing treatment, the patient terminated her relationship with that
doctor and began seeing a new physician who discovered the surgical needle.19
Upon discovery, more than two years after the act of negligence, the patient
filed suit against her physician.20 The Missouri Supreme Court found that the
“act of neglect complained of” was not only the leaving of a foreign object in
plaintiff’s body, but also the subsequent treatment of symptoms caused by the
failure to discover a needle in plaintiff’s body.21 However, the court held that
14. Montgomery v. S. County Radiologists, No. ED 77285, 2000 WL 1846432, at *13 (Mo.
Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2000).
15. Montgomery, 49 S.W.3d at 192.
16. Thatcher v. DeTar, 173 S.W.2d 760 (Mo. 1943); see also RCA Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sanborn,
918 S.W.2d 893, 896 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
17. Thatcher, 173 S.W.2d at 761.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. McBeth, supra note 6, at 563.
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the presence of the physician-patient relationship tolled the statutory two-year
period of limitations until treatment by the health care provider ceased.22 The
Thatcher court defined the continuing care rule by declaring that “the statute
does not commence running until treatment by the physician or surgeon has
terminated, where the treatment is continuing and of such a nature as to charge
the medical man with the duty of continuing care and treatment which is
essential to recovery until the relation ceases.”23
Since Thatcher, few decisions have provided more depth to the framework
of the continuing care relationship, nor have the courts set forth any bright line
rules. The end result is that the applicability of the continuing care exception
depends largely on the circumstances of each individual case. In a few cases,
however, Missouri courts have attempted to clarify what factors will trigger the
continuing care rule.
In 1980, the Western District articulated the underlying rationale for the
continuing care rule in Shaw v. Clough, illustrating the depth and importance
of the physician-patient relationship.24 In Shaw, the plaintiff employed a
physician after sustaining an injury to her cervical area.25 After the defendant
physician performed a medical test that revealed cervical disease, the
defendant performed corrective surgery.26 Subsequent to the surgery,
however, the plaintiff began to experience pain and loss of sensation in a
portion of the body used as the donor site of infusion material during the
surgery.27 Plaintiff continued under the care of defendant physician, who
eventually performed a second exploratory surgery and found that a nerve had
been entrapped during the initial surgery.28 Plaintiff thereafter filed suit,
alleging that the physician was negligent and lacking in requisite skill or
knowledge.29
In Shaw, the court began its opinion by stating that “[b]y its very nature,
the tolling exception to the bar of limitation rule rings out with logic, with

22. Thatcher, 173 S.W.2d at 763.
23. Id. at 762. The court also recognized that a discovery rule was another possible way of
remedying the situation, stating:
[I]t has been held, too, that where injury does not immediately become apparent to the
patient, the statute begins to run in favor of the physician when the injury so appears as to
put the patient on notice and inquiry and not at a later period when a malignant condition
develops there from, or the injury becomes permanently fixed.
Id.
24. Shaw v. Clough, 597 S.W.2d 212, 215-16 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
25. Id. at 214.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Shaw, 597 S.W.2d at 214.
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morality, and with ‘common sense’ as recognized in Thatcher.”30 The court
found that:
The doctor-patient relationship is in most instances a highly personal and close
one, encompassing on the part of the patient a basic confidence and reliance
upon the skills and judgment of the doctor with a reasonable expectation that
such will be met by a deep sense of obligation and proper exercise by the
doctor of his incomparable superior knowledge and the dedicated use of his
best talents and judgment.31

The court further stated that the rationale of Thatcher stems primarily from the
nature of the relationship, and that the treatment obligations arising therefrom
should be considered as a whole until treatment ceases.32
Almost twenty years later in Weiss v. Rojanasathit, the Missouri Supreme
Court articulated four ways in which the physician-patient continuing
treatment relationship may end, thus terminating the duty of continuing care
and beginning the statutory limitations period.33 In Weiss, the plaintiff brought
a medical malpractice action against her gynecologist who failed to inform her
that her medical tests showed the presence of either a pre-cancerous or
cancerous condition.34 After employing a different physician and undergoing
another test almost four years later, the plaintiff was diagnosed with cervical
cancer.35 The court noted that the duty to treat continues until the physicianpatient relationship is ended by: (1) mutual consent of the parties; (2) the
physician’s withdrawal after reasonable notice; (3) the dismissal of the
physician by the patient; or (4) the cessation of the necessity that gave rise to
the relationship.36 Weiss added that absent good cause to the contrary, where
the doctor knows or should know that a condition exists which requires further
medical attention to prevent injurious consequences, the doctor must render
such attention himself or ensure that some other competent person does so
until termination of the physician-patient relationship.37 In Weiss, because the
plaintiff failed to keep a follow-up visit three months after defendant
30. Shaw, 597 S.W.2d at 215; Thatcher v. DeTar, 173 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Mo. 1943).
31. Shaw, 597 S.W.2d at 215. The court found that the relationship between the plaintiff and
physician existed by reason of the plaintiff’s traumatic injury, and that the physician accepted this
relationship and the responsibilities that ensued, namely, the resulting treatment for the plaintiff’s
subsequent right leg condition. Id. at 216.
32. Id. at 215-16; Thatcher, 173 S.W.2d at 762. While the defendant physician sought to
avoid the Thatcher rule by arguing that a foreign object had been left in the plaintiff’s body, the
court explicitly rejected the defendant’s argument by way of reference to Laughlin v. Forgrave,
432 S.W.2d 308, 314 (Mo. 1968), and distinguished the case from Laughlin, which the court
noted was not a continuing care case. Shaw, 597 S.W.2d at 216.
33. Weiss v. Rojanasathit, 975 S.W.2d 113, 119 (Mo. 1998).
34. Id. at 116.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 119-20.
37. Id. at 120.
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performed the medical tests, and because she failed to return at any reasonable
time thereafter, the court found that the physician-patient relationship had
terminated long before suit was filed.38
Missouri courts developed the continuing care exception in only these few
cases. The application of the continuing care rule is very case-specific. As
such, the facts and outcomes of different cases in which the rule was applied
are instructive in an effort to truly grasp what falls within the boundaries of the
continuing care rule.
III. HOW FAR-REACHING IS THE “CONTINUING CARE” EXCEPTION IN
MISSOURI?
Although the applicability of the “continuing care” exception depends
largely on the unique circumstances of each case, Missouri courts have
nevertheless expressed limitations and extensions on the application of this
rule. At this point, it is important to take an in-depth look at the court’s
analysis in each individual case, as each holding adds a small piece to the
framework of the continuing care exception. This part first looks at cases in
which Missouri courts have extended the continuing care exception, and then
discusses Missouri opinions in which the court refused to apply this exception.
Additionally, Missouri opinions involving the application of the exception to a
health care entity are examined.
A.

Extensions of the Continuing Care Exception

In Lorsbach v. Plastic Surgery Consultants, Ltd., the Eastern District
extended the continuing care exception to include post-operative care after a
physician performed a surgical procedure.39 The plaintiff in Lorsbach had a
history of breast lumps, and after having several lumps surgically removed, she
eventually decided to have a breast stripping procedure performed to eliminate
the risk of breast cancer.40 Immediately after surgery, and for months
following the surgery, the plaintiff consulted her physician several times
regarding the unsatisfactory appearance of her breasts and various
complications from the surgery.41 Eight months after the operation, the
38. Weiss, 975 S.W.2d at 120. The court explicitly rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the
statute of limitations was tolled until damages could be ascertained when the plaintiff’s precancerous condition developed into a cancerous condition, noting that the plaintiff’s argument
read “damages” in section 516.105 in a vacuum. Id. at 117. The court stated that the word
“damages” merely specified the type of action subject to the statute of limitations in section
516.105, but “[did] not alter the plain and unequivocal limitation in the statute that such actions
be brought within two years from the date of the act of neglect.” Id. at 118.
39. Lorsbach v. Plastic Surgery Consultants, Ltd., 745 S.W.2d 220, 221 (Mo. Ct. App.
1987).
40. Id.
41. Id.
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plaintiff again contacted her physician, who informed her that another surgery
had to be performed.42 Plaintiff did not authorize the second surgery, but
sought professional opinions from two other physicians.43 The court held that
the plaintiff was under the care and treatment of her physician for several
months after the operation due to complications from the operation itself, and
therefore the statute was tolled until the plaintiff terminated the relationship to
seek another opinion.44
Almost ten years later, the Southern District, in RCA Mutual Insurance
Company v. Sanborn, applied the continuing care exception to toll the statute
of limitations where one physician negligently performed a patient’s initial
surgery as well as two subsequent unsuccessful revision surgeries.45 In this
case, the plaintiff visited a physician for an evaluation of pain in his right hip.46
After concluding that arthritis caused the pain, the physician performed a total
hip replacement surgery, using a prosthesis.47 Six months later, an x-ray
revealed dislocation of the prosthesis and a revision surgery followed.48 Two
months after the revision, the plaintiff complained of pain and swelling in his
right leg, and thereafter the physician performed another revision.49 Postoperative x-rays showed that the physician placed the prosthesis four to five
inches too high, resulting in the shortening of the plaintiff’s right lower
extremity and a permanent functional impairment.50 The plaintiff filed suit,
alleging that he was under the continuing treatment of the physician from the
time of the initial surgery until the end of treatment following the last revision
surgery.51 The court recognized the striking similarity to Shaw, holding that
the second and third surgeries were negligently performed revisions of the
negligently performed first surgery. In RCA, the treatment was viewed as a
whole, thus tolling the statute due to continuous treatment.52
In Adams v. Lowe, the Eastern District held that despite a seven-month
time span between the patient’s surgery and follow-up visit, there was a
42. Id.
43. Lorsbach, 745 S.W.2d at 221.
44. Id. at 220-21.
45. RCA Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sanborn, 918 S.W.2d 893 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
46. Id. at 894.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 894-95.
50. RCA, 918 S.W.2d at 895.
51. Id. at 896.
52. Id. The only difference between Shaw’s and Sanborn’s medical treatment was a third
negligently performed surgery. Therefore, the court held that Shaw dictated the result reached.
The court discussed the importance of viewing the treatment as a whole due to the fact that Shaw
had separately argued that the case be fragmented for purposes of payment by the insurance
company for damages. Id. The court refused to fragment the case, limiting payment of damages
for only one “whole” claim. Id. at 897.
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sufficient nexus to constitute continuing care by a patient’s dentist.53 The
plaintiff’s dentist performed a root canal.54 Following the surgery, the dentist
told the plaintiff that his teeth “would be tender for a while.”55 Seven months
later, the plaintiff revisited his dentist complaining that his teeth were still
tender and his dentist informed him that there were some problems with the
root canal and suggested further surgery.56 The plaintiff then sought a second
opinion from another dentist and filed suit.57 The court, citing Thatcher v.
DeTar, stated that the continuing care exception applied to treatment that is
essential to recovery.58 Because the dentist did not terminate care with the
plaintiff, the court held that the plaintiff’s claim was timely.59
In another surgery-related case, Reynolds v. Dennison, the plaintiff
prevailed in applying the continuing care exception to toll the statute of
limitations against a physician who negligently performed sinus surgery to
remove the plaintiff’s nasal polyps.60 Nearly one year later, the plaintiff was
admitted to the hospital with meningitis, where a hospital physician called the
plaintiff’s physician to examine the patient, and to look for a complication
from the previous surgery.61 While the plaintiff’s physician did not discover
any sinus leakage as a result of the surgery he performed, another physician
did detect it and subsequently corrected it.62 The plaintiff filed suit against his
physician alleging negligent performance of the nasal polyp surgery.63 The
court noted that “treatment” includes measures necessary for the physical wellbeing of the patient.64 The court found that the plaintiff and his physician had
agreed to continue their relationship through “complications,” and even though
the physician did not detect the problems and was, therefore, unaware that any
existed, the relationship had not been terminated by either party.65 Therefore,
the continuing care exception applied and the plaintiff’s suit was not timebarred.

53. Adams v. Lowe, 949 S.W.2d 109 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
54. Id. at 110.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Adams, 949 S.W.2d at 110 (citing Thatcher v. DeTar, 173 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Mo. 1943)).
59. Adams, 949 S.W.2d at 111. The court rejected the defendant dentist’s argument that this
case was similar to Swallows v. Weathers, 915 S.W.2d 763, 764 (Mo. 1996), holding that
Swallows was not applicable, as the “continuing course of treatment theory was untimely
presented and thus not considered by either the trial court or the supreme court [in Swallows].”
Adams, 949 S.W.2d at 111.
60. Reynolds v. Dennison, 981 S.W.2d 641 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
61. Id. at 643.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 642.
64. Reynolds, 981 S.W.2d at 642 n.1.
65. Id. at 643.
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Missouri’s Refusal to Apply the Continuing Care Exception

The Western District, in Shroyer v. McCarthy, refused to extend the
continuing care rule to toll the statute of limitations during the plaintiff’s
attempts, or failed attempts, to discover the identity of his allegedly negligent
treating physician.66 In Shroyer, the plaintiff filed suit, alleging that he
sustained burns on his wrist and was permanently injured when his employer’s
physician improperly and negligently operated an electrical muscle stimulation
unit.67 The plaintiff raised the issue of identity of the treating physician more
than two years after the date of the alleged injury during a hearing on the
employer’s motion to dismiss.68 At that hearing, the name of the allegedly
negligent physician was revealed to the plaintiff and, thereafter, the plaintiff
added the physician as a defendant.69 The court, strictly applying Thatcher’s
continuing care rule,70 held that the date upon which the plaintiff sustained
burns from the physician’s allegedly negligent act was the only occurrence of
negligence complained of and, therefore, the date on which the physician’s
treatment of the plaintiff ceased.71 Because treatment did not continue past the
date of the negligent occurrence, which was more than two years prior to the
plaintiff adding the physician as a defendant, the suit was barred.72
In 1995, the Western District, in Kamerick v. Dorman, held that a
telephone conversation after the last date of medical services rendered did not
rise to the level of medical care, services or treatment required to trigger the
continuing care exception.73 The plaintiff in Kamerick sought treatment with
her physician from 1983 through mid-1987, and discovered she was suffering
from carcinoma in late 1987.74 The plaintiff alleged failure to timely diagnose
the condition and failure to timely refer the plaintiff to a specialist who could

66. Shroyer v. McCarthy, 769 S.W.2d 156 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
67. Id. at 157.
68. Id. at 157-58. Although the defendant physician remained employed by Ford, also the
plaintiff’s employer, for almost one year after the date of his alleged injury, the plaintiff failed to
add the defendant physician to the lawsuit until approximately two years later. Id.
69. Id. at 158.
70. Id. at 161.
71. Shroyer, 769 S.W.2d at 160.
72. Id. The plaintiff also unsuccessfully argued that section 516.100 applied, requiring the
statute of limitations to commence when damages were capable of ascertainment. The court
noted that the Missouri Supreme Court had rejected a similar suggestion in Laughlin, holding that
the specific statute pertaining to medical malpractice actions prevails over the general statute,
section 516.100. Id. “The [Laughlin] court reasoned that the General Assembly deliberately used
the words, ‘from the date of the act of neglect,’ as an expression of purpose to build into that part
of the statute applicable specifically to medical malpractice actions a special provision
independent of, and as an exception to, the provisions of section 516.100.” Id.
73. Kamerick v. Dorman, 907 S.W.2d 264 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
74. Id. at 265.
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have properly diagnosed the condition.75 While the last date on which any act
of negligence could have occurred was in mid-1987, the plaintiff claimed that a
telephone conversation with the physician in late 1987 constituted continuing
care.76 The court cited Thatcher, noting that the plaintiff was not seeking
treatment from her physician at the time of the calls, but rather that she was
merely relaying complaints about the physician’s diagnosis.77 Therefore, the
court held that a telephone call such as this one, made to a physician months
after the last treatment, was not sufficient to trigger an extension of the statute
of limitations.78
The following year, the Western District, in McCrary v. Truman Medical
Center, refused to apply the continuing care exception to treatment provided
by a physician after his recommendation for removal of a painful implant.79 In
McCrary, the plaintiff was first examined by her physician in early 1986
concerning complaints of jaw pain, and shortly thereafter the physician
surgically placed an implant into the plaintiff’s jaw.80 The plaintiff then
returned to her physician’s office seven times over a six-month period.81 A
year and a half later, in 1988, the plaintiff returned to her physician’s office,
again complaining of pain.82 At this visit, the physician recommended removal
of the implant.83 The plaintiff, however, did not return for the operation until
her physician wrote her in 1991 to inform her that the United States Food and
Drug Administration had issued a “safety alert” concerning the implant.84 The
plaintiff then filed suit against her physician in 1993.85 The plaintiff argued
that the continuing care exception should apply to toll the statute of limitations
from the last date that she visited her physician, in 1991.86 The court,
however, disagreed and found that the treatment was terminated by the

75. Id.
76. Id. at 266. The plaintiff claimed that the telephone call created a “reasonable doubt”
regarding the date of the plaintiff’s last treatment by her physician, citing Ventimiglia v. Cutter
Laboratories, 708 S.W.2d 772 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986), for support. In Ventimiglia, the defendant
physician who had treated a young boy for burns had admitted in a deposition that he recalled
glancing at the scars at a later date. Id. The court held that summary judgment was inappropriate
because the date of the physician’s last treatment had not been ascertained. Id. at 774.
77. Kamerick, 907 S.W.2d at 266 (citing Thatcher v. DeTar, 173 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Mo.
1943)).
78. Kamerick, 907 S.W.2d at 266.
79. McCrary v. Truman Med. Ctr., 916 S.W.2d 831 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
80. Id. at 832.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. McCrary, 916 S.W.2d at 832.
85. Id.
86. Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2002]

THE CONTINUING CARE EXCEPTION

1069

physician, who recommended removal of the painful implant in 1988.87 The
court noted that the plaintiff complained of no negligence with respect to the
physician’s treatment after the recommendation of implant removal, making
the plaintiff’s suit time-barred.88
C. Missouri Continuing Care Exception Cases Involving Health Care
Entities
While most of the continuing care cases involved a relationship between a
patient and physician, several early cases, including Shah v. Lehman, Dunagan
v. Shalom Geriatric Center and Uelk v. Barnes-Jewish Hospital, presented
opportunities for Missouri courts to apply the continuing care rule in a
relationship between a patient and a health care entity.89 However, the
circumstances in both Shah and Dunagan did not support application of the
continuing care rule. As a result, the court did not actually reach or discuss
whether the continuing care rule would apply in the context of a relationship
between a patient and a health care entity in depth in either case. In contrast,
the Missouri Court of Appeals in Uelk, relying on both Shah and Dunagan,
explicitly held that the continuing care rule did not apply to hospitals because it
had never been applied to a relationship other than that between an individual
physician and patient.90
In Shah v. Lehman, the Eastern District held that a nine-year gap between a
patient’s treatment and contact with a hospital did not constitute continuing
care.91 In Shah, the plaintiff’s hips had caused her to suffer for more than
twenty years.92 Each hip already had been replaced once before the alleged act
of negligence occurred.93 The surgery in question consisted of removal of her
left hip prosthesis and replacement with a new one.94 During the surgery, the
physicians, who were medical residents employed by the defendant hospital,
placed a cement restrictor in her hip, which was to be left as a medical
implant.95 Nine years later, another surgeon employed by the defendant
hospital performed a second left hip revision on the plaintiff and advised her
87. Id. The court added, “[P]laintiff did not keep an appointment for April 1988, and she did
not return for three years. We can hardly deem this continuous treatment.” Id.
88. Id. at 833.
89. Shah v. Lehman, 953 S.W.2d 955 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); Dunagan v. Shalom Geriatric
Ctr., 967 S.W.2d 285 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998); Uelk v. Barnes-Jewish Hosp., No. ED 77114, 2000
WL 1873293 (Mo. Ct. App. Dec. 26, 2000).
90. Uelk, 2000 WL 1873293, at *2-3 (stating that the Missouri Court of Appeals in
Montgomery held only one week earlier that the continuing care rule may apply to entities and
therefore transferred the case to the Missouri Supreme Court).
91. Shah, 953 S.W.2d 955.
92. Id. at 956.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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that a cement restrictor was embedded in her thigh muscle.96 The plaintiff
brought suit, alleging, among other counts, that “a series of hip revision
procedures performed at the same hospital by both its staff members and nonresident physicians over a several year period constitute[d] ‘continuing care’
by the hospital.”97 The court did not explicitly reject the plaintiff’s continuing
care argument that the claim should be viewed as a whole rather than
fragmented into only two visits.98 The court pointed out, however, that there
was no evidence of any contact between the plaintiff and the hospital for nine
years between the first and second hip revision surgeries.99 Shah held that
such a large lapse between treatments clearly could not fall under the rubric of
continuing care.100
The following year, Dunagan v. Shalom Geriatric Center presented yet
another unclaimed opportunity for a Missouri court to address the application
of the continuing care rule in the context of a relationship between a patient
and a health care entity.101 Dunagan sought to recover damages for five
separate bone fracture injuries he sustained due to alleged negligent and
careless acts that occurred while he resided at a nursing home facility.102 The
plaintiff claimed that the continuing care exception to section 516.105 tolled
the statute of limitations on his claim until the nursing home discontinued his
treatment for Alzheimer’s disease.103 The court noted that Shah had declined
to extend the exception to cases where a hospital allegedly provided continuing
care over a period of time.104 It did not hold, however, this issue dispositive of
the plaintiff’s claim.105 Rather, the court focused on the fact that the nursing
home’s continuing treatment of the plaintiff for Alzheimer’s disease did not
constitute continuing care for the injuries caused by the alleged acts of
neglect.106 Because the plaintiff did not allege that he received from the
nursing home any continuing treatment of his fractures essential to his
recovery, the continuing care exception was held not to apply.107
In 2000, the Eastern District in Uelk v. Barnes-Jewish Hospital, stated that
because it had to follow existing precedent, it had no choice but to hold that the

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Shah, 953 S.W.2d at 956.
Id. at 958.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Dunagan v. Shalom Geriatric Ctr., 967 S.W.2d 285 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
Id. at 287.
Id. at 289; see MO. REV. STAT. § 516.105 (2000).
Dunagan, 967 S.W.2d at 289.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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continuing care rule did not apply to hospitals.108 The plaintiff in Uelk brought
suit against Barnes Hospital, Washington University and two physicians for
alleged medical malpractice.109 Uelk claimed that Barnes was negligent in
performing a transjugular intrahepatic portosystemic shunt procedure on
October 7, 1994.110 Although not pled, both parties agreed that Uelk had
returned to the hospital numerous times for treatment, including a brief
hospital stay, and saw many of the hospital doctors.111 The plaintiff filed suit
on March 30, 1999, more than four years after the performance of the
procedure.112 On appeal, the plaintiff argued that his subsequent visits to the
hospital qualified as “continuing care” so as to toll the statute of limitations
against Barnes Hospital.113
The Eastern District court in Uelk cited both Dunagan and Shah for the
principle that the continuing care exception applies only to individual
physicians, and not to hospitals or other health care facilities.114 The court
added that
unlike an individual physician, who once having undertaken a course of
treatment, may not abandon the treatment until the treatment is completed or
reasonable provisions for its completion are provided, a medical institution
does not have any control over a particular patient and does not know whether
a patient will return to the institution at a later date.115

The Eastern District recognized that no Missouri court had ever held the
continuing care exception applicable to hospitals in the past, and it would not
apply it in Uelk.116 Uelk argued that in this era of specialized health care, there
are no policy reasons for not applying the continuing care doctrine to hospitals
providing health care.117 The court did not explicitly reject this argument, but
noted that this was a matter for the supreme court or legislature to address.118
Uelk thereafter transferred the case to the Missouri Supreme Court, adding that
the Eastern District had also just transferred Montgomery, dealing with the
same issue.119

108. Uelk v. Barnes-Jewish Hosp., No. ED 77114, 2000 WL 1873293, at *2-3 (Mo. Ct. App.
Dec. 26, 2000).
109. Id. at *1.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Uelk, 2000 WL 1873293, at *1.
114. Id. at *2.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Uelk, 2000 WL 1873293, at *2.
119. Id. at *3.
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While the courts in both Dunagan and Shah did not hold health care
entities liable, the continuing care doctrine could not have applied in those
circumstances.120 Similarly, the Uelk court stated that it was unwilling to
apply the continuing care rule to a health care entity absent supreme court
precedent.121 Many other jurisdictions, however, have applied a “continuing
treatment” rule in the context of a relationship between a patient and a health
care entity that is not the patient’s primary care physician, thus paving the way
for the Montgomery holding.122
IV. OTHER JURISDICTIONS’ APPROACHES: CAN DIAGNOSTIC SERVICES
CONSTITUTE CONTINUING TREATMENT?
Several jurisdictions, including New York, Wyoming, Delaware and South
Dakota, applied the “continuing treatment” rule to health providers in
circumstances similar to the facts in Montgomery. These jurisdictions have
primarily focused on the fact that the services rendered by health care
providers are of substantial underlying importance to the treating doctor.
As far back as 1975, New York recognized treatment by a diagnostic
health care entity as constituting “continuing care.”123 In Fonda v. Paulsen, an
independent pathologist read the plaintiff’s biopsies on two occasions, thirtytwo months apart.124 Fonda held, “we are of the opinion that to hold [the
defendant pathologist] as having ‘treated’ plaintiff only at the times of his
biopsy diagnoses is to take a view of the case which is analogous to the
outworn theories under which privity of contract was required before liability
could ensue.”125 The court noted that the nature of a pathologist’s work is such
that he rarely has any direct physician-patient contact.126 The physician,
therefore, never treats patients in the conventional sense.127 However, the
court afforded greater weight to the plaintiff’s argument that a pathologist’s
work is often the basis upon which the attending physician makes decisions as
to subsequent treatments.128 Fonda turned on the issues of foreseeability and
reliance. The court held that where the pathologist should have reasonably
expected that other practitioners would rely on his work in determining the
mode of the patient’s treatment, constructive participation in the treatment

120. Montgomery v. S. County Radiologists, No. ED 77285, 2000 WL 1846432, at *13-14
(Mo. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2000).
121. Uelk, 2000 WL 1873293, at *2-3.
122. Montgomery, 2000 WL 1846432, at *13-14; see discussion infra Part IV.
123. Fonda v. Paulsen, 46 A.D.2d 540 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975).
124. Id. at 541.
125. Id. at 542.
126. Id. at 545.
127. Id.
128. Fonda, 46 A.D.2d at 543.
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would be imputed to the pathologist or diagnostician for as long as treatment
continued.129
On similar facts, the Wyoming Supreme Court decided Sharsmith v. Hill in
accordance with Fonda.130 In Sharsmith, the plaintiff had contacted her
physician regarding a lump behind her knee.131 After testing, her physician
concluded that the lump was benign, and took no action until the mass
enlarged and required surgery for removal.132 After the removal surgery, the
mass was examined by two of the hospital’s pathologists.133 Both pathologists
determined that the mass was benign.134 The plaintiff experienced swelling at
the operative site nine months after the surgery, at which point her physician
requested that one of the original pathologists again review the slides of the
mass.135 That pathologist thereafter personally assured the plaintiff that the
mass was benign.136 The plaintiff later returned to her physician, who found
two distinct masses around the operative site, and sent the plaintiff for a
biopsy, which showed that the tumors were malignant.137 Upon review of the
original slides, it was determined that the original mass removed was
malignant, and not benign as the pathologist had reported.138 The plaintiff
subsequently elected to have her leg amputated above the knee.139
The plaintiff filed suit against both pathologists who reviewed the original
slides and misdiagnosed the mass as benign, claiming that the statute of
limitations was tolled by way of the “continuous treatment” exception.140 The
plaintiff argued that her physician’s course of treatment should be imputed to
the pathologists and the hospital because her physician continued to rely upon
the misdiagnosis of the pathologists throughout the course of the plaintiff’s
treatment.141 The court agreed with plaintiff, finding that it was the
physician’s adherence to the pathologist’s diagnosis that dictated the nature

129. Id. at 543. Interpreted this way, the practitioner guilty of the initial malpractice is
subject to the same period of limitations as those who continued the malpractice as a reasonably
foreseeable result of the initial wrong. Of course, a point may come where continuation of a
course of treatment was negligent in and of itself irrespective of the original erroneous diagnosis;
at that point, the diagnostician’s constructive continuance in the treatment would have ceased. Id.
130. Sharsmith v. Hill, 764 P.2d 667 (Wyo. 1988).
131. Id. at 668.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Sharsmith, 764 P.2d at 668.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 669.
138. Id. at 669-70.
139. Id. at 669.
140. Sharsmith, 764 P.2d at 669-70.
141. Id. at 670.
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and duration of the plaintiff’s treatment.142 The Wyoming court, like New
York, emphasized the fact that the plaintiff’s physician relied on the
misdiagnosis.143 The court held that based on “grounds of fairness as well as
basic logic,” until the alleged misdiagnosis was corrected, or until her
physician ceased to rely upon it, the pathologist’s constructive involvement in
that treatment was sufficient to prevent the running of the statute of
limitations.144
The Delaware Superior Court relied on the Fonda decision and reached a
similar conclusion in Bissell v. Papavastros Associates Medical Imaging.145 In
Bissell, the personal representative of the deceased patient’s estate brought a
medical malpractice action against a radiologist who negligently read and
reported the results of a series of three mammograms performed by the same
laboratory over a three-year period.146 Each mammogram was compared to the
others, and each time cancer was ruled out.147 However, the plaintiff was
diagnosed with cancer a year later and died the following year as a result.148
The plaintiff claimed that the tests were part of a collective pattern of
negligent treatment, while the defendant argued that the tests were separate and
discrete.149 The court noted that each new test required not only the
defendant’s own analysis, but also a comparison to the prior test.150 Citing
Fonda, the Bissell court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment,
stating that it raised a genuine issue of material fact on the question of whether
the mammograms were discrete negligent acts or a continuous negligent act.151
The court stated that, in circumstances where the pathologist should have
expected that his work would be relied on by practitioners in determining the
mode of treatment, it was appropriate to impute to the diagnostician
constructive participation for as long as treatment continued.152
In Sander v. The Geib, Elston, Frost Professional Association, a similar
case in South Dakota, the court came to the same basic conclusion as Bissell.153
The plaintiff in Sander received routine gynecological examinations from her
general physician, including pap smears.154 All of the pap smears taken by the

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Echols v. Keeler, 735 P.2d 730, 731 (Wyo. 1987)).
626 A.2d 856, 865 (Del. Super. Ct. 1993).
Id. at 857.
Id. at 858.
Id. at 859.
Id. at 864.
Bissell, 626 A.2d at 864.
Id. at 865.
Id.
506 N.W.2d 107, 114 (S.D. 1993).
Sander, 506 N.W.2d at 110.
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physician were sent to the same clinical laboratory for evaluation.155 The
laboratory had a process by which it analyzed each of the plaintiff’s slides,
comparing new slides to previous slides to make a diagnosis. 156 The
pathologists reported no abnormal or atypical cells in any of the patient’s
However, when the plaintiff later consulted her physician
slides.157
complaining of pelvic pain, erratic periods, and tiredness, her physician took
another smear which revealed cervical cancer.158 After the previous slides
were re-examined, it was discovered that the laboratory had misread the slides,
and that cancerous cells had been present three years earlier.159 The plaintiff
brought a medical malpractice action against the clinical laboratory for alleged
negligence in reading her pap smear slides. The trial court found that there
was a continuing treatment relationship between the plaintiff and the
laboratory.160
The South Dakota Supreme Court agreed with the trial court, recognizing
that the continuing treatment doctrine is “based upon an on-going, continuous,
developing and dependent relationship.”161 The court refused to take seriously
the defendant’s argument that information regarding deficiencies in its testing
program had nothing to do with the plaintiff’s level of trust.162 The service
provided by the laboratory was critically important to the patient who was
completely dependent upon the professional to screen for an insidious
disease.163 Sander, like the previous courts cited above, focused on reliance,
noting that the plaintiff’s physician relied upon the laboratory’s classification
system for detecting potential cancer and relied upon its reports to facilitate his
choice of therapy.164 The court also found particularly relevant the fact that the
relationship between the plaintiff and the lab was not sporadic, but routine.165
Furthermore, during the time relevant to the suit, the plaintiff had no contact
with any other party for her gynecology exams, pap smears, or screenings until
after she was diagnosed with cancer.166
While this is only a small sampling of other jurisdictions’ approaches in
this area, the analysis required in deciding whether or not to apply the
continuing care exception is highly fact-specific. The facts of these previously

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id.
Id. at 115.
Id. at 111.
Id.
Sander, 506 N.W.2d at 112.
Id.
Id. at 114.
Id.
Id. (citing Morgan v. Taylor, 451 N.W.2d 852, 858 (Mich. 1990)).
Sander, 506 N.W.2d at 115.
Id.
Id.
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discussed cases are remarkably similar to the facts in Montgomery. In
addition, the underlying themes present in the courts’ analyses shed light on
the rationale underpinning the Montgomery decision.
V. MONTGOMERY V. SOUTH COUNTY RADIOLOGISTS: EXPANSION OF THE
CONTINUING CARE RULE
A.

The Majority: A Diagnostic Health Care Entity’s Duty of Continuing Care

Evan Montgomery sought treatment from a neurosurgeon at St. Anthony’s
Medical Center in St. Louis, Missouri, for chronic lower back pain.167 In order
to make a diagnosis, Montgomery’s neurosurgeon referred him for diagnostic
radiological services to South County Radiologists (“SCR”), St. Anthony’s
exclusive radiological services provider.168 SCR’s medical doctors specialized
in radiology.169 These radiologists interpreted films, which were taken by
technicians at St. Anthony’s.170 When a patient was first referred to SCR, a
patient file was created, on which an SCR radiologist recorded patient
diagnostics and information.171 Each time an SCR radiologist reviewed a
patient’s films, the radiologist placed the film and the diagnostic report in the
patient’s file.172 It was common for patients to receive additional radiological
services after the initial consultation.173 When this occurred, the radiologists
reviewed and compared previous reports and films.174
Montgomery underwent a series of three services by SCR, each by
different radiologists at the facility who, when reviewing his film, failed to
recognize a cancerous tumor on his spine.175 None of the radiologists
personally saw or examined Montgomery, but only viewed his films.176 Eight
months after his first service at SCR, Montgomery contacted another
radiologist not associated with SCR, who immediately detected the tumor in
his lower back.177 Montgomery thereafter terminated treatment by SCR, and
two years and eight months from the inception of treatment by SCR,
Montgomery and his wife filed suit against SCR and its three radiologists for
medical negligence.178
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Montgomery v. S. County Radiologists, 49 S.W.3d 191, 192 (Mo. 2001).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 193.
Montgomery, 49 S.W.3d at 193.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Montgomery, 49 S.W.3d at 193.
Id.
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Both SCR and Dr. Szoko, the first radiologist who reviewed
Montgomery’s films, moved for summary judgment alleging that Montgomery
filed suit after the two-year statute of limitations.179 The circuit court ruled for
Szoko and SCR, specifically noting that the “continuing care” exception did
not apply.180 On appeal, the Eastern District reversed the grant of summary
judgment to both Szoko and SCR and remanded the case.181 Montgomery
arrived at the Missouri Supreme Court after a dissenting judge transferred the
case.182
Judge Duane Benton delivered the supreme court’s opinion in
Montgomery, concluding that: (1) the court properly entered summary
judgment in favor of Szoko because the Montgomerys’ suit exceeded the twoyear statute of limitations of section 516.105 and did not fall under the
“continuing care” exception; and (2) the court erred in granting partial
summary judgment to SCR because it was a health care entity that owed a duty
of continuing care to the plaintiff.183
Regarding the plaintiff’s claim against Dr. Szoko, the supreme court noted
that Szoko committed only one act on one specific date: the initial diagnostic
service on February 14, 1995.184 The plaintiffs claimed that Szoko had a duty
of continuing care to Montgomery based on the fact that Szoko performed the
initial radiological service, participated as a shareholder with other physicians
in a rotating assignment system, never withdrew or was dismissed as
Montgomery’s physician and provided essential services to Montgomery.185
This argument was dismissed by the court without any explicit consideration,
other than to say that where a physician only has contact with a patient once,
the statute of limitations begins to run on that date.186 Citing Thatcher, the
Montgomery court noted that a prerequisite for the continuing care exception is
that a patient was under the doctor’s ongoing care.187 The court found that the
Montgomerys’ allegations were insufficient to show that Szoko’s care was
“continuing.”188 Therefore, summary judgment was granted to Dr. Szoko.
With regard to the claim against SCR, the court held that the Montgomerys
alleged a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether SCR had a duty of
continuing care.189 The plaintiffs successfully argued that, since SCR was the

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 192.
Montgomery, 49 S.W.3d at 193.
Id. at 194-95.
Id. at 194.
Id.
Id.
Montgomery, 49 S.W.3d at 194.
Id.
Id.
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sole provider of radiological services for St. Anthony’s, adopted the system of
rotating physicians, never withdrew or was dismissed as Montgomery’s
provider of diagnostic services, and provided three services over nine months
that were essential to Montgomery, there was a sufficient relationship to
constitute “continuing care” between SCR and the plaintiff.190
Just as the defendant in Shah argued that services should be fragmented
rather than viewed as a whole, SCR argued that each interpretation of an x-ray
or MRI was a discrete, intermittent service, so that the prerequisite of
SCR reasoned that the treatment
“continuing care” was not met.191
relationship ended with each film interpretation, which they asserted was the
“necessity that gave rise to the relationship.”192
The court found that SCR’s view of the relationship between a diagnostic
service provider and patient was too narrow.193 It held that “the necessity that
gives rise to the relationship is the patient’s ailment or condition.”194 Citing
Cazzell v. Schofield,195 the court reaffirmed the long enunciated proposition
that the physician-patient relationship can only be terminated in a few select
ways, namely “by the consent of the parties, or . . . by the dismissal of the
physician, or until his services are no longer needed.”196 The court implied
that none of these factors were present in this case.
SCR’s argued that only the treating physician can have a duty of
continuing care and treatment to the patient, and that SCR’s diagnostic services
were not of such a nature as to charge it with a duty of continuing care.197
Montgomery stated that SCR’s argument was without validity, as neither Shah
nor Dunagan held that health-care entities could never have a duty of
continuing care.198 The court noted that by invoking section 516.105, SCR had
already conceded that it was an “entity providing health care services.”199
Looking only at the text of section 516.105, the court found that the statute
covers any “entity providing health care services,” without distinguishing
between different types of providers.200
190. Id.
191. Shah v. Lehman, 953 S.W.2d 955, 956 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); Montgomery, 49 S.W.3d at
194.
192. Montgomery, 49 S.W.3d at 194.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Cazzell v. Schofield, 8 S.W.2d 580, 587 (Mo. 1928).
196. Montgomery, 49 S.W.3d at 194 (citing Cazzell, 8 S.W.2d at 587).
197. Montgomery, 49 S.W.3d at 195. SCR cited dicta from both Shah and Dunagan for the
proposition that health care entities cannot have a duty of continuing care.
198. Id. As discussed supra, both Shah and Dunagan did not reach the issue of whether
health care entities could have a duty of continuing care, but rather held that the rule did not apply
under the factual circumstances in each case. See supra notes 89-107 and accompanying text.
199. Montgomery, 49 S.W.3d at 195; MO REV. STAT. § 516.105 (2000).
200. Montgomery, 49 S.W.3d at 195; MO REV. STAT. § 516.105 (2000).
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The court recognized that the treating physician must rely on specialists,
such as those providing radiological and other diagnostic services.201 As stated
in Weiss, “the doctor must render [continuing care and treatment] or must see
to it that some other competent person does so until termination of the
physician-patient relationship.”202 Fleshing out this line of reasoning, the
majority found that just as a treating physician owes a comprehensive duty of
continuing care and treatment to a patient, “an entity that provides continuing
radiological services has a proportionate duty of continuing care until its
relation[ship] with the patient ends.”203
Lastly, the court dismissed SCR’s argument that radiologists do not have a
physician-patient relationship that charges them with any duty of continuing
care.204 Citing Shaw, SCR argued that its relationship with Montgomery was
not a “highly personal and close one.”205 The court found this argument to be
without validity holding that SCR was composed of ten medical doctors
specializing in radiology.206 While the radiology group’s obligations are not as
comprehensive as the treating physician’s, “its services are of such a type as to
charge it with accurately interpreting and comparing x-rays and MRIs for the
same complaint by the same patient about the same part of the body, three
times within a nine-month period.”207
B.

Limbaugh’s Dissent: Was There a Sufficient Relationship to Warrant
Extending Continuing Care?

Judge Benton’s holding, tolling the statute of limitations against SCR,
drew a single dissenter, Chief Justice Limbaugh. Limbaugh argued that
extending the continuing care exception to SCR was inconsistent with the
rationale behind the exception. Limbaugh primarily disagreed with the court’s
argument that the necessity giving rise to the continuing care relationship was
the patient’s ailment or condition.208 Limbaugh posited that when SCR and its
physicians undertook each examination of the patient, neither they, nor the
patient intended that care or treatment would continue beyond the conduct of
the examination ordered.209
Limbaugh further argued that, since the treating physician was “calling the
shots” as to whether SCR and its physician should conduct additional
201. Montgomery, 49 S.W.3d at 195.
202. Id. (quoting Weiss v. Rojanasathit, 975 S.W.2d 113, 120 (Mo. 1988) (en banc))
(alteration in original).
203. Montgomery, 49 S.W.3d at 195.
204. Id.
205. Id. (quoting Shaw v. Clough, 597 S.W.2d 212, 215 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980)).
206. Montgomery, 49 S.W.3d at 195.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 196 (Limbaugh, J., dissenting).
209. Id.
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examinations, and SCR did not have the option or the duty to continue or
discontinue the series of examinations that was ordered, there was no
“relationship” to speak of.210 Additionally, Limbaugh focused on the fact that
while entities, as well as individuals, may have a duty of continuing care,
radiological service providers do not have the same duty as individuals serving
in the role of a treating physician.211
VI. AUTHOR’S ANALYSIS
A.

Policy Considerations

While the holding in Montgomery was rendered decades after other
jurisdictions already extended the continuing care exception to diagnostic
health care providers, this decision clearly reflects the vast and continuing
changes that have taken place in current health care practice.212 The Eastern
District in Montgomery noted that in our rapidly changing technological
society, there are daily medical advancements and achievements, which have
influenced both the practice of health care and the quality of patients’ lives.213
People expect expanding care for the wide range of medical complaints they
have, and the astute patient realizes that the manner in which health care in this
country is provided is changing.214 Today, patients no longer go to a single
physician expecting total treatment, but instead understand that one doctor is
neither capable nor competent to provide for every medical exigency.215 While
a patient’s regular physician may prove effective and affordable in many
circumstances, specialists are integral members of the modern health care team
and may be more successful and efficient in providing care to patients than a
regular physician in particular clinical circumstances.216 The Eastern District
noted, however, that, in spite of the fact that one physician often cannot
provide treatment in many specialized situations, “patients do expect that their
primary doctor will refer, consult, and rely on a team of duly qualified health
care professionals to maintain and treat medical conditions for their total health
care needs.”217

210. Id.
211. Montgomery, 49 S.W.3d at 196.
212. Montgomery v. S. County Radiologists, No. ED 77285, 2000 WL 1846432, at *12 (Mo.
Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2000).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Bryan A. Liang, Access to Health Care in the United States, 22 J. LEGAL MED. 211, 217
(2001).
217. Montgomery, 2000 WL 1846432, at *12.
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Today, doctors’ expanding caseloads require assistance from other health
care professionals for specialized care and treatment.218 “Changes in our
health care system are continuing, even accelerating.”219 Because of such
changes, patients inevitably receive health care from a diverse number of
providers, a phenomenon that is only certain to increase with the additional
emphasis on primary care and managed care.220 In light of these facts, patients
understand that doctors are no longer capable of providing every essential
service or treatment. Patients understand that they will be assisted and
monitored by professional health care providers as part of a treatment team
focused on providing them with medical care in all areas necessary for
treatment and diagnosis.221 Unfortunately, however, even though modern
medicine involves other decision-making entities such as hospitals and HMOs,
“[c]ourts have been slow to recognize that these institutions are an integral part
of the care that a patient receives, and that such care often encompasses the
‘continuing care’ that follows an incident of malpractice resulting in injury.”222
Up until the Montgomery decision, Missouri had not taken a step in that
direction.
As noted by Dr. F. Ronald Feinstein, an administrator of the largest
managed care organization in the world, “[t]he fundamental shift required to
provide both quality and cost-effective care must be to a health care system
with members acting as a team using a patient-centered model for care
delivery.”223 However, because doctors so often must rely on specialists to
provide full medical care to patients, these specialists must ultimately be
accountable for their actions.224
The Eastern District emphasized that the court does not wish to encourage
primary care providers to attempt medical care outside their capabilities, and
specialists should not be immunized from liability due to the fact that they are
providing specialized treatment as part of a medical care team.225 For this
reason, the Eastern District court found that treatment by a diagnostic care
facility should be viewed as part of a total health care management plan, rather
than fragmented into particular visits or examinations.

218. Id. at *13.
219. Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Preserving the Physician-Patient Relationship in the Era of
Managed Care, JAMA, Jan. 25, 1994, at 4.
220. Id.
221. Montgomery, 2000 WL 1846432, at *13.
222. Uelk, 2000 WL 1873293, at *3 (Teitelman, J., concurring).
223. Liang, supra note 220, at 217.
224. Montgomery, 2000 WL 1846432, at *13.
225. Id. “Under this paradigm, . . . the members of the team will represent all the expertise
required to comprehensively treat the patient so that the right thing is done at the right time.”
Liang, supra note 200, at 217.
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Montgomery Revisited

Applying this reasoning to Montgomery, the continuing care rule should
apply to Szoko as well as SCR, yet the court refused to toll the statute against
Szoko.226 The majority rejected SCR’s argument that the service the group
provides is discrete and intermittent, ending with each interpretation.227 The
court reasoned that SCR’s view of the relationship was too narrow, and on that
reasoning it only logically follows that the statute of limitations should be
tolled against Szoko as well. Viewing the radiology group as only a small part
of a total health management team, and Dr. Szoko as a part of that group, the
duty of continuing care should equally extend to both. Both SCR and Szoko
were part of that health care team providing continuing services to patients at
St. Anthony’s. After all, it was Szoko’s initial diagnosis that Montgomery’s
physician relied on in commencing a treatment plan for Montgomery.
Additionally, each of the other two radiologists who viewed Montgomery’s
subsequent films utilized Szoko’s report to some extent in making their
diagnoses. As recognized in Sharsmith, Szoko’s treatment of Montgomery
continued for as long as his physician relied on that negligent interpretation of
the film in his continuing treatment of Montgomery, or until the misdiagnosis
was corrected.228 For this reason, it seems logical that the court should view
Dr. Szoko’s liability as it views the radiology group’s.
Moreover, as the Eastern District recognized, SCR argued in Montgomery
that each service it provided was merely a discrete, intermittent service.229
This argument is unrealistic, as well as contrary to what the radiology group’s
own policy contemplated. SCR’s formal method of reviewing patient
information on each visit and synthesizing findings with those reported
previously indicate that SCR anticipated providing continuing care to patients
on a regular basis.230 Furthermore, most diagnostic service providers in SCR’s
position, the sole contracted service provider for a hospital, could certainly not
be surprised to find that the diagnosis they provide to a treating physician is an
integral part in the physician’s treatment and diagnosis.231 Clearly, clinical
laboratories provide essential health services in aiding physicians by furnishing
information that is invaluable to the diagnosis and treatment of disease.232
Moreover, the improper performance of a laboratory procedure may induce an
erroneous diagnosis or contribute to the selection of an inappropriate method

226. Montgomery v. S. County Radiologists, 49 S.W.3d 191, 194 (Mo. 2001).
227. Id.
228. Sharsmith v. Hill, 764 P.2d 667, 670 (Wyo. 1988).
229. Montgomery, 2000 WL 1846432, at *3.
230. Id. at *13.
231. Montgomery, 49 S.W.3d at 195.
232. Blum, supra note 1, at 46. This definition of clinical laboratories is set forth in N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 570 (Consol. 1990).
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of treatment, resulting in prolonged or unnecessary hospitalization, injury, or
even death.233 Although the services of a physician and laboratory are
divisible, they act as collaborators, not antagonists.234 The work of a patient’s
physician and a radiologist interpreting the patient’s films, for example, is
interrelated, “for the analysis performed by a laboratory . . . bears directly upon
the course of medical treatment to be provided; a proper diagnosis can
facilitate recovery while an incorrect analysis can spell prolonged
affliction.”235
Additionally, while the supreme court chose not to set forth specific policy
reasons underlying its denial of summary judgment to SCR, the holding is
consistent with the rationale evidenced by the Eastern District in Montgomery
at the appellate level.236 The same theme of trust and reliance on the expertise
of professionals, found in cases in other jurisdictions applying the continuing
treatment exception, applies in Montgomery.
The facts of Montgomery are noticeably similar to the factual
circumstances in cases from other jurisdictions where courts have extended the
“continuing care” exception. Just as the South Dakota court recognized in
Sander,237 not only did Montgomery himself rely on the diagnostic services,
but Montgomery’s neurologist equally relied upon the laboratory’s specific
system for detecting disease in order to properly diagnose Montgomery.
Additionally, the review system used by SCR in Montgomery was similar to
that of the diagnostic group in Sander in that both groups reviewed the
previous reports and films on the particular patient when the patient returned
for subsequent treatment at the facility.238 For that reason, SCR, like the
Sander diagnostic group, knew that they were providing continuing care as a
team to patients who routinely returned for radiological services.239
The facts of Montgomery are, likewise, similar to Sharsmith.240 Like the
general practitioner in Sharsmith who treated the patient based on the diagnosis
obtained from the laboratory, Montgomery’s physician continued to rely upon
the misdiagnosis of the pathologists throughout his course of treatment of the
plaintiff, and it was his neurologist’s adherence to the pathologist’s diagnosis

233. Id. The court in Calvin v. Schlossman recognized this principle where it held that a
private medical laboratory had the status necessary to bring it within the jurisdiction’s medical
malpractice statutory scheme. 427 N.Y.S.2d 632 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980).
234. Blum, supra note 1, at 47.
235. Id.
236. Montgomery v. S. County Radiologists, No. ED 77285, 2000 WL 1846432, at *13 (Mo.
Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2000); see also Sharsmith v. Hill, 764 P.2d 667, 670 (Wyo. 1988).
237. Sander v. The Geib, Elston, Frost Prof’l Ass’n, 506 N.W.2d 107, 114-15 (S.D. 1993).
238. Id.
239. Montgomery, 2000 WL 1846432, at *13.
240. Montgomery v. S. County Radiologists, 49 S.W.3d 191 (Mo. 2001); Sharsmith, 764 P.2d
667.
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that dictated the nature and duration of the plaintiff’s treatment.241 SCR’s
services were essential to Montgomery’s neurologist’s diagnosis, and essential
to his treatment of Montgomery’s lower back ailments.242
As the Eastern District recognized, the radiological services provided to
Montgomery were an essential part of his care without which his neurosurgeon
could not have properly treated him.243 Montgomery placed his trust in his
neurosurgeon and in those health care professionals who his neurosurgeon
involved as part of the health care team in the continuous treatment of his
lower back pain.244 While Montgomery did not specifically explain the reasons
for the holding, this rationale comports with that of the Eastern District and
other jurisdictions deciding cases under similar fact patterns.
While Limbaugh focused a large portion of his dissent on the fact that SCR
and its physicians did not anticipate a continuing relationship with
Montgomery,245 the flaw in this argument is in its suggestion that the care
provider’s intention in treatment is of the greatest importance to the duty of
continuing care. Does a physician or health care provider have to intend for
treatment to continue in order for care to be continuing?
Whether the health care provider is a physician or a diagnostic group, the
patient’s needs should be determinative of whether care will continue, and that
patient’s needs often stem from the existence of a particular ailment or
condition. To argue that a diagnostic group intends to provide only a one-time
service ignores the fact that diagnostic entities provide an essential service that
affects a patient’s entire mode of treatment.
Under the circumstances in Montgomery, where a physician does not have
the specialized training to recognize the presence of disease in the patient’s
film, the radiologist is providing more than just a one-time service, he is
providing a diagnosis that will affect the physician’s course of treatment of that
patient.246 In that sense, the radiologist’s care is continuing. His diagnosis, or
in Montgomery’s case, misdiagnosis, has a substantial effect on the treatment
scheme that the physician provides for the patient. The fact that the physician
treats the patient relying on the radiologist’s finding after viewing only a few
slides on a few occasions does not exempt the radiologist from continuing to
be a part of the patient’s health care management team. So long as that
physician is still relying on the diagnosis of that particular diagnostic group in
treating the patient, the radiologist’s treatment does not end until either the
patient or physician terminates the radiologist’s role as part of the patient’s

241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

Sharsmith, 764 P.2d at 670.
Montgomery, 2000 WL 1846432, at *13.
Id. at *12.
Id.
Montgomery, 49 S.W.3d at 196-98.
Montgomery, 2000 WL 1846432, at *12.
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health care team or until the cessation of the necessity that gave rise to the
relationship.247
But, as Limbaugh would ask, was not the treating physician “calling the
shots?” Under Limbaugh’s reasoning, a diagnostic service provider would
never be held accountable for negligence. Where the radiology group is the
sole provider of services for a particular physician, and that physician employs
the group’s services in the treatment of a patient, that group is part of a health
care team involved in the continuing treatment of the patient. The physician
may “call the shots,” but the physician does so relying on the expertise of other
team members. Negligence on the part of any one service provider who is part
of that team can have an effect on the entire course of treatment that the
physician takes. Society has chosen accountability as its main mechanism to
ensure respect for those in the health care field.248 Therefore, all medical
decision-makers must be held equally accountable for their decisions affecting
patients’ health.
C. The Malpractice Statute Should Be Tolled—But is the Continuing Care
Rule the Way to Go?
The author agrees with the other jurisdictions that focus on reliance as the
primary justification for applying the continuing care rule to diagnostic health
care entities. It is important to note, however, as stated above, that the
Missouri continuing care rule first articulated in Thatcher is based on the
rationale that “[t]he doctor-patient relationship is . . . a highly personal and
close one.”249 When, if ever, does a patient have a highly close and personal
relationship with a diagnostic services physician or group practice? While the
author agrees with the Montgomery court’s decision to toll the statute of
limitations, the Montgomery court’s use of the continuing care rule in doing so
in inappropriate. The justification behind the continuing care rule articulated
in Thatcher simply does not comport with the relationship between a
diagnostic radiologist or diagnostic group and a patient.
Diagnostic radiologists diagnose diseases of the human body using x-rays,
ultrasound, radio waves and radioactive materials.250 They generally act as
consultants to other physicians who are caring for a patient, reading films for
medical diagnostic purposes.251 Diagnostic radiologists advise doctors of the
best radiographic examination to perform for a particular patient’s problem,
247. Weiss v. Rojanasathit, 975 S.W.2d 113, 119-20 (Mo. 1998) (en banc).
248. See Carl Gieseler, Managers of Medicine: The Interplay Between MCOs, Quality of
Care, and Tort Reform, 6 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 31, 63 (1999).
249. Shaw v. Clough, 597 S.W.2d 212, 215 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
250. Kaitatari Hihi Irirangi, Diagnostic Radiologist, at http:// www.careers.co.nz/jobs/3c_doc/
j80011a.htm (last modified Apr. 12, 2001).
251. University of Maryland Medicine, Radiology Information Guide, at
http://www.marylandradiology.com (last visited Jan. 22, 2002).
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supervise radiographic examinations of a patient performed by the medical
radiation technologist, interpret images from radiographic examinations, and
review examinations with the doctors treating the patient.252 Just about every
area of medicine uses diagnostic radiology to aid in treatment of the patient.253
Because of the types of tasks the diagnostic radiologist and the diagnostic
group perform, the relationship between a diagnostic radiologist and a patient
is frequently anything but “close and personal.” Often, the diagnostic
radiologist is nothing more than a faceless specialist acting behind the scenes,
making conclusions that affect a patient’s whole course of treatment without
ever having met the patient. For this reason, courts have found that radiology
traditionally has not involved the close personal relationship likely to develop
between a patient and a treating physician in other specialties.254
Because diagnostic radiologists so often do not develop the personal
relationship with the patient that the continuing care rule presupposes, it does
not seem fit under Missouri’s rationale to apply the continuing care rule
against such specialists. However, Montgomery likely responded to the
modern changes in health care by expanding this rule. The fact remains that
expanding this rule to include a diagnostic entity that does not have that
personal physician-patient relationship goes directly against the rationale
behind the continuing care rule. However, if the court cannot extend the
continuing care exception in worthy circumstances, such as those present in
Montgomery, what other possible recourse is out there?
D. An Alternative Approach
While the Montgomery decision will likely have a great impact on claims
of medical negligence involving health care services provided by diagnostic
specialty groups in Missouri, the few reasons Montgomery advances in support
of its argument are less than enlightening. Because Montgomery did not fully
seize this opportunity to explain its reasoning behind extending the continuing
care rule to a diagnostic group, which clearly did not have a personal
relationship with Montgomery, it may be that this exception has run its course.
In other words, this decision may be evidence that the court supports adoption
of a discovery rule.
Thus far, Missouri courts have repeatedly rejected the adoption of a
discovery rule for medical malpractice actions, stating that the argument is best

252. Irirangi, supra note 250.
253. University of Maryland Medicine, supra note 251.
254. See Eslami v. Eslami, 591 A.2d 411 (Conn. 1991); Patricia C. Kuszler, Telemedicine and
Integrated Health Care Delivery: Compounding Malpractice Liability, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 297,
326 n.11 (1999).
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addressed by the General Assembly.255 The discovery rule provides that a
cause of action accrues not at the time of the negligent act, as section 516.105
now provides, but at the time a plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have
discovered, the injury.256 This is a more reasonable approach since plaintiffs
are frequently unable to detect the problem giving rise to liability for
negligence on the date the act occurred, often because the problem may not
emerge until much later, after the statutory period has run.257 At least twentysix states currently have a discovery rule in effect for medical malpractice
claims.258 These states have given various reasons for adoption of the
255. While recognizing that a discovery rule for malpractice actions is appealing as far as
justice is concerned, the court in Weiss noted that the legislative branch of the government has
determined the policy of this state and has clearly fixed the time when the limitation period
begins to run against actions for malpractice. Weiss v. Rojanasathit, 975 S.W.2d 113, 121 (Mo.
1998).
In Laughlin v. Forgrave, the Missouri Supreme Court was faced with a request to adopt
a discovery rule in cases where foreign objects were left within a patient after surgery. At that
time, the court responded:
It is obvious that plaintiff did not know and could not have known of the cause of her
injury and damage or that she had a cause of action against the defendant before
September, 1962; she certainly could not have discovered the cause of her pain and the
damage she sustained when seven doctors did not. This argument is appealing and has
some force, so far as justice is concerned; in that respect the conclusion we reach is
distasteful to us. But, the legislative branch of the government has determined the policy
of the state and clearly fixed the time when the limitation period begins to run against
actions for malpractice. This argument addressed to the court properly should be
addressed to the General Assembly. Our function is to interpret the law; it is not to
disregard the law as written by the General Assembly.
Laughlin v. Forgrave, 432 S.W.2d 308, 314 (Mo. 1968).
More recently, the court reconsidered the issue in Miller v. Duhart. The court stated:
[Section 516.105] is written with clarity and precision, and does not allow this court to
assume that legislative intent was to the contrary. However, the legislature is strongly
urged to correct the inequity which the present malpractice statute creates in discovery
cases other than those concerned with foreign objects. Despite arguments to the contrary,
that body is the best forum with which to deal with this problem. Courts should not
legislate. Many of the problems in our legal system and indeed in our society as a whole
have been caused by the judicial activism which creates uncertainty and instability in the
law. This court declines to adopt a discovery rule.
Miller v. Duhart, 637 S.W.2d 183, 190 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
256. John F. Appelquist, Will Missouri’s ‘Open Court’ Guarantee Open the Door to Adoption
of the ‘Discovery Rule’ in Medical Malpractice Cases?, 52 MO. L. REV. 977, 984 (1987).
257. Bartimus, supra note 1, at 33. As section 516.105 is written, it can be argued that this
statute bars meritorious cases through the use of a restrictive statute of limitation. While this
statute seeks to cut down on the number of medical malpractice cases filed, it simultaneously has
the potential to force some vague, questionable cases to be filed. Some non-meritorious cases are
undoubtedly filed each year because attorneys, rushed by the shortened time period, do not have
the time to have these matters adequately and properly evaluated. Id. at 34.
258. Appelquist, supra note 256, at 284. See Leech v. Brailar, 275 F. Supp. 897, 902 (D.
Ariz. 1967); Costa v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 254 P.2d 85, 91 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1953);
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discovery rule.259 Some courts have declared that the use of any different rule
would allow an unjust result. Others have found that it is within the province
of the judiciary to find a discovery rule when the legislature has been silent on
the issue and the court determines that such a reform is necessary. Still others
argued that the discovery rule must be adopted or else the statute of limitations
without such a rule creates unreasonable and absurd results.260 Nevertheless,
Missouri remains in the minority in declining to implement this rule.
As of the Montgomery decision, Missouri has not adopted a discovery rule.
Missouri, however, has slowly extended the continuing care exception and also
has slowly chipped away at section 516.105 through the addition of other
exceptions, which toll the statute of limitations in specific instances.
For instance, in response to the court’s opinions in specific cases, the
legislature has set forth two exceptions, which allow the discovery rule in
limited circumstances: in cases involving foreign bodies and medical testing.261
In cases in which a foreign object has negligently been left in the patient’s
body, section 516.105 allows the action to be brought “within two years from
the date of discovery of the negligent act, or from the date on which the patient
in the exercise of ordinary care should have discovered such alleged
negligence.”262 A similar exception exists for a situation where there has been
a negligent failure to inform a patient of the results of medical tests.263
The “Thatcher rule” came into existence long before these two exceptions
were added to section 516.105, and this rule has likely survived for half a
century due to its adaptability. Because the legislature has only adopted these
few exceptions to section 516.105, and because the legislature has not codified
Rosane v. Senger, 149 P.2d 372, 376 (Colo. 1944); City of Miami v. Brooks, 70 So.2d 306, 309
(Fla. 1954); Yoshizaki v. Hilo Hosp., 433 P.2d 220, 223 (Haw. 1967); Billings v. Sisters of
Mercy, 389 P.2d 224, 232 (Idaho 1964); Lipsey v. Michael Reese Hosp., 262 N.E.2d 450, 455
(Ill. 1970); Waldman v. Rohrbaugh, 215 A.2d 825, 830 (Md. 1966); Johnson v. Caldwell, 123
N.W.2d 785, 791 (Mich. 1963); Johnson v. St. Patrick’s Hosp., 417 P.2d 469, 473 (Mont. 1966);
Spath v. Morrow, 115 N.W.2d 581, 585 (Neb. 1962); Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 248
N.E.2d 871, 873 (N.Y. 1969); Iverson v. Lancaster, 158 N.W.2d 507, 510 (N.C. 1968); Seitz v.
Jones, 370 P.2d 300, 302 (Okla. 1961); Berry v. Branner, 421 P.2d 996, 1000 (Or. 1966); Ayers
v. Morgan, 154 A.2d 788, 794 (Pa. 1959); Ruth v. Dight, 453 P.2d 631, 636 (Wash. 1969);
Morgan v. Grace Hosp., 144 S.E.2d 156, 162 (W.Va. 1965).
259. McBeth, supra note 6, at 560-61.
260. Id.; Yoshizaki v. Hilo Hosp., 433 P.2d 220, 224 n.7 (Haw. 1967); Wilkinson v.
Harrington, 243 A.2d 745, 749 (R.I. 1968); Layton v. Allen, 246 A.2d 794, 797 (Del. 1968);
Frohs v. Greene, 452 P.2d 564, 565 (Or. 1969). Some states which have adopted the discovery
rule also impose a double limitation by setting a time limit in which the claim must be brought
after discovery of the injury, not to exceed an ultimate time limit which runs from the date of the
negligent act itself. McBeth, supra note 6, at 561.
261. Thatcher v. DeTar, 173 S.W.2d 760 (Mo. 1943); Weiss v. Rojanasathit, 975 S.W.2d 113
(Mo. 1998); MO. REV. STAT. § 516.105 (2000).
262. MO. REV. STAT. § 516.105.
263. Id.
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this exception, the continuing care rule continues to evolve as a tool for the
court to toll the statute of limitations in deserving instances. The extension of
this rule to diagnostic health care providers in Montgomery is no exception. At
this rate, the continuing care rule may repeatedly be expanded to act like a
discovery rule. While this trend could continue, there is at least one good
reason why the discovery rule is a better alternative and should replace the
continuing care exception.
Because the continuing care exception tolls the statute of limitations until
the patient’s relationship with the health care provider terminates, this
exception has the potential to create an incentive for physicians and health care
entities to terminate care at the earliest sign that a negligent act has been
performed in order to start the running of the statute of limitations. While the
Thatcher rationale focused on the duty of a health care provider to continue to
provide treatment for a patient, it has also been recognized that one way to
terminate the relationship is by the physician’s withdrawal after reasonable
notice.264 In a situation where a negligent act has been committed, which does
not fit into the “foreign body” or “medical test” exception, and the patient is
still in a continuing care relationship with that physician, the only way the
statute of limitations will begin to run is through termination of that
relationship by one of the four means articulated in Weiss.265 The potential for
harm to the patient in a situation like this far outweighs any danger that could
result from instituting a discovery rule. The Eastern District has made an
“urgent plea” to the General Assembly to reconsider this issue in light of the
injustice inherent in the current statute of limitations.266 However, to this date,
the Missouri Legislature has failed to do so.
Without adoption of the discovery rule, Missouri courts may find it
impossible to expand the continuing care exception to accommodate every
twist and turn so as to prevent unfairness to a patient who is being treated by a
health care team. The discovery rule would eliminate the problems that the
court currently faces in trying to stretch the continuing care exception to apply
to diagnostic groups. This is likely the true reason why the court set forth so
few reasons for it’s current expansion of the continuing treatment exception.
Because of the potential injustice inherent in rejecting the discovery rule in
favor of the “continuing care” exception, adopting a discovery rule is the only
way of ensuring that justice prevails.
VII. CONCLUSION
Since its beginning in Missouri nearly half a century ago, the continuing
care exception has expanded and changed form to toll the often harsh statute of
264. Weiss, 975 S.W.2d at 119.
265. Id. at 119-20.
266. Appelquist, supra note 256, at 986.
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limitations in many deserving circumstances. Montgomery is certainly no
exception. Because the court is powerless to institute a discovery rule,
however, this exception has remained the only tool for the court to use to
extend the statute of limitations. Dissenters may argue that the Thatcher
rationale behind the continuing care exception simply will not allow the
exception to withstand the continual changes in the medical world. That
argument, however, is at odds with the reality that the state of health care in the
United States is ever-evolving, with no end in sight. Although Montgomery’s
sizeable stretch of the rationale behind this exception should alert the
legislature that statutory change is a must, the long history of Missouri courts’
futile efforts in breaking through to the legislature proves that this outlook
would be naïve. Health care’s continual transformation will only force the
continuing care exception to perform more acrobatics in the years to come. At
some point, before the “continuing care” bubble bursts, the Missouri
legislature must take action and institute a discovery rule.
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